Dismantling Operational Practices of BGP Blackholing at IXPs

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The Internet suffers



The problem!

Blackholing

The solution?

Common

belief

Blackholing is an effective measure to mitigate DDoS

Common (mis) belief

? Blackholing is an effective measure to mitigate DDoS

?

Agenda



Recap How does BGP Blackholing work at IXPs?



Deployment Status

How well deployed is Blackholing in the real world?





Future Enhancements


How should we configure fine-grained filtering?


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole#/media/File:Black_hole_-_Messier_87_crop_max_res.jpg

I. How does BGP Blackholing work at IXPs?











Remotely-Triggered Blackholing and BGP Policies



Remotely-Triggered Blackholing and BGP Policies





II. How well deployed is BGP Blackholing in the real world?

Our measurement approach

One of the worlds-largest IXPs as a central vantage point Wholistic view: >100 days, all related data - **no exceptions!**

BGP data

All RTBH messages from all route-servers


Flow data

All sampled packets from the public switch-fabric for prefixes which have been blackholed at least once


We verified: Time is in sync!

Do all IXP member accept RTBH announcements ?


Successful mitigation depends on the announced RTBH prefix length




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



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



How fast do IXP members react to DDoS events?











Analysis of 72 hours before an RTBH Event

Use a sliding window algorithm (EWMA) to infer whether one of the **monitored features** exhibits an anomalous peak:

- i. number of packets
- ii. number of unique destination ports
- iii. number of flows
- iv. number of unique source IP addresses
- v. number of non-TCP flows

Analysis of 72 hours before an RTBH Event

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
Amplification Attacks

TCP SYN Attacks


GRE Floods

- i. number of packets
- ii. number of unique destination ports
- iii. number of flows
- iv. number of unique source IP addresses
- v. number of non-TCP flows

Most anomalies occur up to 10 minutes before an RTBH Event



Most anomalies occur up to 10 minutes before an RTBH Event



III. Should we configure fine-grained filtering?



https://www.steinchenspiel.de/

Many clients residing in DSL networks are DDoS'ed and blackholed

Whitelisting is not an option as no regular traffic patterns exist

Most attacks are very simple, **blacklisting** few attack vectors is very effective

More details:



ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2019

Down the Black Hole: Dismantling Operational Practices of BGP Blackholing at IXPs

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Large Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks pose a

major threat not only to end systems but also to the Inter-

net infrastructure as a whole. Remote Triggered Black Hole

filtering (RTBH) has been established as a tool to mitigate

inter-domain DDoS attacks by discarding unwanted traffic

early in the network, e.g., at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs).

As of today, little is known about the kind and effectiveness

of its use, and about the need for more fine-grained filtering.

In this paper, we present the first in-depth statistical analy-

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Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. Recent attacks peak beyond multiple Tbps (Terabit per second) [23]. DDoS attacks build upon simple to exploit IP address spoofing [19] in combination with amplification characteristics of network protocols such as NTP, DNS, or cLDAP [4, 12]. These attacks deplete network bandwidth to suppress legitimate traffic towards a destination IP. In consequence, a network or web service is not reachable anymore. Still, DDoS attacks do not only cause damage at the attacked system itself, but can also overwhelm the infrastructure of intermediate or upstream





ABSTRACT



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Summary. Operational advice.

1. Check your BGP policies.

Accept more specific prefixes, in particular /32, in case of RTBH announcements.

2. Check your routing tables for RTBH 'zombies'. Routing tables may contain many unnecessary/inexplicable RTBH entries. Contact your peers to understand their RTBH use cases.

3. Consider fine-grained filtering.

Majority of DDoS attacks are still not complex. Simple port-based blacklisting (ACLs, BGP Flowspec) can be very effective.